Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues,

first of all let me thank Prof. Kosmopoulos and the organising committee for your kind invitation which comes as an honour to me.

To start I would like to invite you to a little fantasy experiment: Imagine, you will end up — let’s say due to the "Y2K bug", the millennium computer problems — on a remote island and you will have to start a completely new life. Would you develop as a different person than you were before? Or would you be quite the same with some external differences, but in the core the same person as you were? What do you think about yourself? What is it that makes you the person you are: what you brought with you, what was given to you from the very beginning and what in the course of time grew out of your inner? or what you developed through the important relationships of your life and thus will keep on changing in new relationships? What is it that makes you be you? And please don’t say too quickly: both. Everybody has a deep and often implicit, not reflected theory about him- or herself. If it really matters, he or she thinks: "I can handle that from out of my inner strength", or he or she is convinced to be fully dependent on the relationships he or she is in. — Did you find out your conviction?

Today I am going to deal with the subject of this symposium on a basic, philosophical — and partly even on a theological — level, because I believe that talking about education, about the person of the educator, about the person of the child or pupil or student and the educational relationship between or among them has to be rooted in anthropology, in an image of men — which for Jews and Christians is inseparably linked to the image of God, who created man in his own image (Gen 1,27).

I am a practical theologian teaching at the university and a person-centred psychotherapist and psychotherapy trainer. When I founded person-centred training in Austria thirty years ago, I had no idea where my encounter with Carl Rogers and his colleagues in the eighties and the ongoing challenge of dealing with person-centred relationships in several fields would lead me to. As a matter of fact I was led to ask on multiple levels again and again what it really means to be person-centred. What is the core of the radical paradigm shift of Carl Rogers’ approach? This question more and more became an existential one to me. What is the essence of being a person and encountering other people as persons? In order to deal with that I was attracted to do some research on the notion of the term from which the approach got its name: the person.

Even if the name may first have originated for pragmatic reasons (that is, to find a comprehensive term for clients, pupils, communication partners, group members etc.), Rogers also deliberately chose it because of its essential meaning (cf. Kirschenbaum 1979, 424). For, unlike other psychotherapeutic and social–psychological interpretations, the Person–Centred Approach takes a radical look at the human being as a person.

Philosophy took a long time to consider man of sufficient value to be worth asking questions about and only in the twentieth century has philosophy really become serious about the fact that man can never include himself in his questions without entering into dialogue with his own kind. The mainstreams of psychology and some orientations of pedagogy have not even now really undertaken this paradigm shift. Likewise, psychotherapy still considers its task as one of diagnosis and interpretation. This is exactly what Carl Rogers spoke out against. The Person–Centred Approach does not ask, as objectifying philosophy did for many centuries and subsequently psychology and psychotherapy did and still do, what man is, and accordingly does not orient its practice of assistance towards treating a human being as an object. It asks, as does personalism (the philosophy of dialogue), following a shift of philosophical paradigms, who man is, and consequently considers it to be its goal to encounter a human being as a fellow man. This takes into account that such a question always includes the person asking and that he or she is always inextricably involved. Strictly speaking, the question as to who man is can also no longer be phrased in a general way; on the contrary, the appropriate question would be put in concrete terms: "Who are you?" This question, however, asks about the personhood of a particular human being. Thus, person is not the concrete term for a general notion, but always refers to someone unique.

But how was this expression adopted by philosophy? The colloquial term which denotes the relationship in the social structure was first introduced by theologians to their terminology when, following the experiences with Jesus, they aspired to define more precisely the relationship between him, God, whom he called his father, and his spirit (the Holy Ghost). Reflecting on this, the Fathers of the Church used the Roman relationship term "persona" in their doctrine of the Trinity and they formulated the concept of "one God in three persons" in order to accentuate equality (and also to emphasise that God is one but not lonesome; on the contrary, he is community). Therefore up to the present day the notion of person as a professional term has been characterised by two still relevant factors: it has been used to define an empirical fact, and from the very beginning it has aimed at characterising equality (cf. Schmid 1991).

This terminology, however, did not really solve the problem, but intensified the conflict: What is the crux of being a person? The individual component? The relationship? It is this very question that has occupied almost two thousand years of philosophy until today. Two traditions emerged, an individualistic one and a relationalist one.

The individualistic (or substantialistic) conception of the person was first defined by Boëthius (480–525 AD), quoting Aristotle’s "De Anima": "Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia [the person is the indivisible substance of a rational being]." Substance derives from "sub–stare" which literally means "achieving a standing position from below", which therefore means standing by oneself, being based upon oneself and thus implies autonomy and independence — or, to be precise, indivisible independence ("in–dividuum"), which ultimately cannot be divided, shared, communicated. In this tradition we find Thomas Aquinas, the Enlightenment, Kant who emphasises the status and dignity of the person who may not be used as a mere device, but who is an end in himself or herself deserving freedom and therefore capable of being held responsible.

This becomes explicitly clear in existential philosophy: Heidegger, Jaspers and — particularly relevant — Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) stress man’s responsibility, man who experiences himself in his existence, his "Dasein", in his individual uniqueness and non–transferability, in his potential for choice and for freedom and for whom it is essential "to be that self which one truly is" (Kierkegaard 1849, 17) — a quotation with which Carl Rogers (1961a, 163, 166) prefaces a chapter about genuineness.

Therefore, whoever associates person with independence and uniqueness, freedom and dignity, unity, sovereignty and self–determination, responsibility, human rights etc., sees himself or herself in the tradition of such an individualistic conception of the person. That is what is meant when man is defined as a person, starting from the moment of conception and regardless of his physical or mental health and development. Being a person therefore means being–from–oneself ["Aus–sich–Sein"] and being–for–oneself. ["Für–sich–Sein"].

This conception of the person is especially influential in the early period in Carl Rogers’ thinking during which, based on the actualising tendency, he mainly understands man from the individualistic point of view and consequently sees therapy as a process of the development of personality with its emphasis on confidence in the organism, a realistic Self and, above all, positive regard and empathy as beneficial conditions.

As the initiators of the other, the relationalistic tradition, we find the Fathers of the Church. In patristic theology the person is understood as being in relationship. God’s being is relationship, is pure being related, "esse ad". Centuries later Richard of St. Victor (died 1173 AD) defines person as "naturae intellectualis existentia incommunicabilis [incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature]". Here, person is not conceived as a sub–sistence, but as an ek–sistence, as coming into being from outside ["ex"], through others, as standing opposite to others (and hence as inexchangeable, "incommunicabilis"). Therefore, a person is he or she who has become himself or herself precisely through others. A constituent element of the person is his her originating relationship — for example the relationship between the child and its mother. Phenomenology, existentialism and the philosophy of values [Wertphilosophie] emphasise that as a subject the person is beyond any objectification.

In particular, however, personalism (also called "dialogical thinking") underlines that thinking in terms of subject and object is not applicable to the person. Fichte already had suggested: "Man only becomes a human being when he finds himself among human beings — if there are human beings at all, then there must be several of them". The personalistic philosophers, first and foremost Martin Buber (1878–1965), constantly underline the dialogical existence of man: "The I is developed through the Thou. While becoming an I, I say Thou. All real life is encounter." (Buber 1923, 18). "The person emerges while entering into a relationship with others" (Buber 1948, 164). Here we have arrived at Rogers’ second "favourite philosopher", one by whom he himself was significantly inspired (cf. Rogers/Buber 1960). The "I–Thou–relationship" of dialogue, which Rogers often quotes, is characterised by immediacy, that is devoid of any "media" (means), and by presence, therefore it always occurs in the present moment. "Between the I and the Thou there is no purpose. All means are obstacles. Only wherever all means are disintegrated, does encounter take place." (Buber 1923, 78f).

The Lithuanian encounter philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1905–1995), the "Other–oriented thinker" who is still to be discovered for the Person–Centred Approach (Levinas 1961; 1974; 1983), interprets the fact that the person depends on relationship in an even more radical way than Buber: the foundation of self–awareness is not reflection (by the I facing the Thou), but the pre–determined experience of relationship (Thou–I instead of I–Thou). As such, the Other is not an alter ego, but remains a mystery and hence a continuous challenge. He "descends upon us", for which Levinas uses the metaphor of "visage", evoking the origin of the term "person". This visage addresses us and its need challenges us. This is why ethics is the foundation of every philosophy and why responsibility — Levinas calls it "diakonia [service]" which precedes every dia–logue — is the fundamental category of being a person: from the encounter arises the obligation to a response. Thus he criticises all European philosophy so far as mere egology. Even a sentence like "The I is developed through the Thou." is suspect of using the Other in order to become oneself.

Teilhard de Chardin’s (1881–1955) conception of personalisation (becoming a person) also belongs to this relationalistic tradition. Teilhard refers to the ability of the person to transcend, and he understands personalisation as an evolution of the person linked to the socialisation of humanity [socialisation de l’humanité], leading to the coincidence of the personal and the universal. One is reminded instantly of Rogers assertion that the most personal is the most general (1961a, 26).

So, whoever understands the person through relationship, through dialogue, through partnership, through connection with the world, through the condition of being dependent on others, through interconnectedness, whoever sees him or her in the totality of the community, as basically unavailable, whoever emphasizes that man is person as far as he has a relationship with others, follows the tradition of the relationalistic (transcendent) conception of person. Being a person thus means being–from– and –in–relationship ["Aus– und In–Beziehung–Sein"], being through others.

This conception of man as a person particularly characterises Rogers’ later work, where he understands the human being as "person to person", as being in a group and in community. Consequently, mutual encounter is a decisive element in therapy and personal development, and Rogers now considers genuineness as a pre–eminent facilitative condition. The person is brought to fruition in dialogical encounter: He who becomes himself while encountering others becomes a person. Teilhard’s conception of a personalisation of the entire creation in the direction of future perfection and Rogers’ conception of a formative tendency, together with his references to spirituality, point to considerable similarities, as do Rogers conception of therapy in accordance with the encounter concept and Levinas’ interpretation of ethics as the primary philosophy that recognizes the obligation of responsibility deriving from the primordial experience of relationship and the perception of the Other as a continuous challenge.

In the substantialistic as well as in the relationalistic conceptions of the person we find important approaches which render it impossible for a current point of view to regress to earlier conceptions. If the substantialistic approach underlines what the person is, then the relationalistic approach accentuates how this person has become a person. From the very beginning man is an individual person and from the very beginning he is related in personal community with others. It is only through the relationships with other persons that he develops and actualizes his being as a person: he becomes a personality. Thus essential elements of the person are both, independence and dependence on relationships, sovereignty and commitment, autonomy and solidarity.

Only in the dialectic of both interpretations, not in an "either–or", but in a "both–and" does the mystery of the person become accessible to whoever allows himself or herself to become involved in a relationship from person to person. A conception gained from these two perspectives of the person contrasts with an individualistic–privatistic conception of the human being just as it does with a collectivistic one.

Offering help, doing psychotherapy, social or pastoral work, educating in a person–centered understanding means letting oneself in for a personal relation. That implies putting oneself into play and trusting in the possibility that such a relationship, be it among two persons or within a group (Rogers 1962a; 1970a; 1980b; Schmid 1994; 1996a; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c), is the most important contribution to facilitating the development of each individual’s personality (Rogers 1961a; 1970a; 1980a; Schmid 1989; 1991; 1998b).

This kind of relationship person to person is called encounter.

Etymology shows that the English word "encounter" as well as the French word "rencontre" contains the root "contra", the Latin word for "against"; in the same way the German word "Begegnung" is formed from the root "gegen [against]". Semantics point to the "against", indicating the vis–à–vis as well as the resistance. One can encounter an object (a landscape for instance or a piece of art: "reality encounter") or a person ("Thou–encounter", "interpersonal encounter").

One of the important roots of the meaning of encounter lies in the Jewish–Christian tradition: the Jewish precept of charity considers the Other (through love) to be a brother. This concept becomes particularly clear in the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10, 29–37). The reason for biblical brotherly love is the universal love of God in whose sight all are equal. God, who identifies himself with "the least", is loved if man loves his brother; man encounters God in concrete brotherly love as is expressed in the parable of the Last Judgement (Mathew 25, 31–46): "What you did to the least of my brothers, you have done to me."

In encounter philosophy encounter is understood as an amazing meeting with the reality of the Other. Encounter means that one is touched by the essence of the opposite (Guardini 1955). To let this happen, a non–purpose–oriented openness and a distance which leads to amazement are indispensable conditions. In an encounter the relationship "centres in the Other". According to Paul Tillich (1886–1965), with whom Rogers entered into an open dialogue as he did with Buber (Rogers/Tillich 1966), the person emerges from the resistance in the encounter of the Other: if the person "were not to encounter the resistance of other selves, then every self would try to take itself as absolute. [...] An individual can conquer the entire world of objects, but he cannot conquer another person without destroying him as a person. The individual discovers himself through this resistance. If he does not want to destroy the other person, then he has to enter into a community with him. It is through the resistance of the other person that the person is born." (Tillich 1956, 208) To Martin Buber the "I–Thou"–relationship, the encounter happens where one becomes presence to the Other. Being a person consists in the event of encounter or dialogue, of communicating oneself.

Emmanuel Levinas’ (1905–1995) anthropological premise is, in a much more radical way than Buber"s, the "absolute being–different" of the Other. His approach leads from the encounter experience towards ethics as a foundation for all science. The movement goes from the Thou to the I. This Other is an appeal and a provocation: out of the being addressed by the Other (which is a demand) grows a fundamental responsibility [diakonia]. By responding I only fulfil my duty. But what people do owe each other is love. Thus, encounter in dialogue turns out to be a condition for self–consciousness, to be a common transcendence of the (totalitarian) status quo, to be a start without return: Abraham, who starts his journey to an unknown country without return, and not Ulysses, who at the end returns to his starting–point, is to be seen as the symbolic character.

Helping, educationg is facilitating, as Professor Kosmopoulos (1999) already stressed.

Such an approach quite fundamentally rules out any conception of oneself on part of the therapist or helper or teacher or educator etc. as an expert on the problems or on the person of the partner in counselling, therapy, education, supervision or any other helpful relation whatsoever. Such an approach also rules out that this person considers him– or herself as an expert in the correct usage of methods and means, and even excludes any preconceived use of methods and techniques, which is not rooted in the immediate experience of the relationship. The only "means" or "instrument" employed is the person him– or herself. And only where any means has fallen apart encounter takes place, as Martin Buber (1923, 19) stated unsurpassably and precisely also grasping the process of such a relationship. Therefore the Person–Centered Approach differs radically from those other approaches in both therapy and education as well as in many other fields of life, which in the meantime have all more or less found their way to the core conditions of authenticity, unconditional positive regard and empathy brought out and accurately described by Rogers (1957a; 1959a). However, these approaches consider Rogers’ conditions, attitudes and definitions only as preparatory design of relations meant to establish a certain climate or rapport, as obviously–human preconditions so to speak, upon which the actual therapeutic or pedagogic work still has to be constructed. For the person working in the person–centered field the realisation of these basic attitudes, which at the time has to be newly put into effect during the process, represents the help which needs no supplementation by specific methods and techniques reserved for the expert. "Expertism", if it has to be described, lies exactly in the ability to resist the temptation of behaving like an expert — that means, organising the relationship or solving problems with the help of techniques rather than facing them as persons.

I am convinced that also in the field of education the essence of the Person–Centered Approach has not yet been sounded out by far, let alone has it been put into effect, in its radicalism, its profound humanism and in its critical potential, a potential towards emancipation. Carl Rogers’ positions and visions are not at all outdated, they have not even been caught up with. Without doubt it is a valuable merit of the approach that today, half a century later, even behaviour therapists, psychoanalysts and systemic people realise the importance of the personal, the personal and actual relationship, the core conditions ("without which nothing works", as these therapies now also agree). But even if others adopt some of these positions, they have by no means yet got at the core of the approach, centred on the person of the human being.

If education has to do with — better: if it is — "real life", then, according to Buber (1923, 18) and Levinas, it has to be a dialogue, it has to be encounter. And "Freedom to learn" (Rogers 1969a) turns out to be a fruit of personal encounter.

Encounter — I hope I could make that clear — is not at all meant in a pathetical way. It is the experience of being, the experience of life with all its (and my and your and our) limitations. In an age of pluralisation and constructivist thinking — in André de Peretti’s (1999) neo–baroque era — encounter also means to endure multiple ways, multiple realities, multiple concepts, multiple truths. If education, according to Dieter–Jürgen Löwisch (1989) has to do with openness for cultures, cultural freedom and critique of culture, in our days educators have to practise modesty: Education is the attitude and capability of a person who learned to know not to know. It is a constant, steady and reliable invitation to mutually learn from each other and to become who you are by encountering each other person to person. It is a "way of being", more precisely "a way of being with", as Carl Rogers coined it — as, on the field of healing, is therapy, as is counselling. As such primarily it is an ethical task in the sense of Levinas: It is an ethical challenge to respond to each other out of our response–ability.

Thank you.

Endnotes

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De Peretti, André (1999) Éducation, formation et implication voluntaire. Lecture at the University of Patras, Symposium Education and Educator, 1999

Guardini, Romano (1955) Die Begegnung. Ein Beitrag zur Struktur des Daseins, Hochland 47(3), 224–234

Kierkegaard, Søren (1849), Die Krankheit zum Tode. Jena 1921. 2^nd edn, 1924 (1^st edn, 1849)

Kirschenbaum, Howard (1979) On Becoming Carl Rogers. New York: Delacorte

Kosmopoulos, Alexandros (1999) Education as a relationship between persons today. Lecture at the University of Patras, Symposium Education and Educator, 1999

Lévinas, Emmanuel (1961) Totalité et infini. Essai sur l'extériorité. Den Haag: Nijhoff. (7^th edn,1980)

– (1974) Autrement qu'être ou au delà de l'essence. Den Haag: Nijhoff (2^nd edn,1978)

– (1983) Die Spur des Anderen. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie. Freiburg: Alber (3^rd edn,1992)

Löwisch, Dieter-Jürgen (1989), Kultur und Pädagogik. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft

Rogers, Carl R. (1957a) The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change, Journal of Consulting Psychology 21(2), 95–103

Rogers, Carl R. (1959a) A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client–centered framework', in Koch, Sigmund (ed.) Psychology, the Study of a Science. Vol. III: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw Hill, 184–256.

– (1961a) On Becoming a Person. A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin

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– (1980b) Client–centered psychotherapy, in Kaplan, Harold I., Sadock, Benjamin J., and Freedman, A. M. (eds.) Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, III. Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 2153–2168.

Rogers, Carl R. and Buber, Martin (1960) Dialogue Between Martin Buber and Carl Rogers, transcribed by Kenneth N. Cissna and Rob Anderson 1994; orig.: Martin Buber and Carl Rogers, Psychologia. An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient (Kyoto University) 3(4), 208–221

Rogers, Carl R. and Schmid, Peter F. (1991) Person–zentriert. Grundlagen von Theorie und Praxis. Mainz: Grünewald (3^rd edn, 1998)

Rogers, Carl R. and Tillich, Paul (1966) Dialogue Between Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers. Parts I & II. San Diego: San Diego State College

Schmid, Peter F. (1989), Personale Begegnung. Der personzentrierte Ansatz in Psychotherapie, Beratung, Gruppenarbeit und Seelsorge, Würzburg: Echter (2^nd edn, 1995)

–(1991) Souveränität und Engagement. Zu einem personzentrierten Verständnis von Person, in Rogers and Schmid 1991, 15–164

– (1994) Personzentrierte Gruppenpsychotherapie, vol. I: Solidarität und Autonomie. Ein Handbuch. Cologne: Edition Humanistische Psychologie

– (1996a) Personzentrierte Gruppenpsychotherapie in der Praxis, vol. II: Die Kunst der Begegnung. Ein Handbuch. Paderborn: Junfermann

– (1996b) "Probably the most potent social invention of the century". Person–Centered Therapy is fundamentally group therapy', in Hutterer, R., Pawlowsky, G., Schmid, P. F., and Stipsits, R. (eds) Client–Centered and Experiential Psychotherapy. A Paradigm in Motion. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 611-625

– (1997) "Encountering a human being means being kept awake by an enigma" (E. Lévinas). Prospects on further developments in the Person-Centered Approach, paper presented on the occasion of the IVth International Conference on Client-Centred and Experiential Psychotherapy (ICCCEP), Lisbon 1997

– (1998a) Im Anfang ist Gemeinschaft. Personzentrierte Gruppenarbeit in Seelsorge und Praktischer Theologie, vol. III. Beitrag zu einer Theologie der Gruppe. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer

– (1998b) "On becoming a person-centred approach". A person-centred understanding of the person, in: Thorne and Lambers 1998, 38–52

– (1998c) Face to face. The art of encounter, in: Thorne and Lambers 1998, 74–90

– (1998d) Nouvelles perspectives pour l'évolution de l'approche centrée sur la personne, in Brennpunkt, Numéro spécial 1998, 103-112

– (1999) "A way of being with" (C. Rogers). Prospects on further developments of a radical paradigm, Keynote lecture, Vienna, 2nd World Congress for Psychotherapy, 1999

Thorne, Brian and Lambers, Elke (eds.), Person-Centred Therapy. A European perspective, London: Sage 1998

Tillich, Paul (1956) Systematische Theologie. Vol. I. Berlin: de Gruyter. (3rd edn, 1956)